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CULTURE AS DEFICIT: A CRITICAL
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT
OF CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL WORK DISCOURSE
YOOSUN PARK

Columbia University
School of Social Work

This paper is a critical discourse analysis of the usage of the concept of
"culture" in social work discourse. The paper argues that "culture" is
inscribedas a markerfor difference which has largely replacedthe categories
of race and ethnicity as the preferred trope of minority status. "Culture" is
conceived as an objectifiable body of knowledge constitutingthe legitimate
foundationforthe building of interventions.But such interventionscannot
be considered other than an instrument which reinforces the subjugating
paradigmfrom which it is fashioned. The concept of culture, constructed
from within an orthodoxic, hegemonic discursive paradigm, is deployed as
a marker of deficit.
Keywords: culture, culture definition, culturalcompetence,multiculturalism, discourse analysis,criticaldiscourseanalysis, social work discourse
This paper examines social work's usage of the concept of
culture. Using critical discourse analysis (CDA), a neo-Marxist
turn to the study of discourse which examines language and its
usages to understand their social and political import, this paper
investigates the particular ways in which "culture" is inscribed
and deployed in social work discourse. In following the tenets of
CDA, language and discourse are approached in this study "as the
instrument of power and control.. . . as well as the instruments
of social construction of reality" (Van Leeuwen, 1993, p. 193).
Discourses are understood to be central modes and components
of the production, maintenance, and conversely, resistance to
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systems of power and inequality; no usage of language can ever
be considered neutral, impartial, or a-political acts. This study,
consequently, examines the particular meanings social work assigns to "culture," and analyzes the implications for constructing
and utilizing such a signifier. It studies, in other words, what the
concept of culture does in the disciplinary discourse.
This study is grounded in the theoretical position that the
usage of the concept of culture in social work and the meanings
social work assigns to "culture" are profoundly political, biased,
and partial inscriptions. "Cultural constructions are always 'ideological,' always situated with respect to the forms and modes of
power operating in a given time and space" (Ortner, 1998, p. 4).
"Culture" is to be understood as a relational demarcator whose
usage is an inscription of differential positions and hierarchical
identities-a tractable device which can be used to demarcate
whatever a particular set of interests dictates should be set apart
from something else; included or excluded from the rest. The borders and the contents of "culture," in other words, are understood
to be constructed rather than discovered (Allen, 1996).
For the purposes of this paper, social work discourse on "culture" is defined narrowly as the body of academic or scholarly
discussions and expositions on "culture" found in social work
publications. A preliminary review of such materials indicated
that "culture" appears most often as the primary subject of interest in two related arenas: social work education and social
work practice. In both cases, the main problematic is pedagogymethods for teaching either students or workers to become "culturally competent." Twelve such works, selected from social work
journals including Social Work, Journalof Multicultural Social Work,
Journal of Social Work Education, and Child Welfare constitute the
admittedly limited sources for generalizations about the disciplinary discourse. The large body of social work literature focusing on issues of "culture" and "cultural sensitivity" in research
was omitted from the review to limit the scope of the discussion.
The plethora of articles concerning multiculturalism, diversity,
and culture in associated fields such as psychology and sociology
were excluded for the same reason. In keeping with the intent to
examine the general trend of the discussion in the field, no concerted efforts were made to identify works considered seminal,
or authors regarded as notable authorities.
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A Conceptual Muddle
The concept of culture has taken on increasing significance in
the discourse of social work in recent years. As a central construct
in discussions of multiculturalism, diversity, social justice, and
the correlate issues of minority populations which it is most
often employed to denote, "culture" has become a key signifier
of difference in our discourse. Its increasing usage as a central
indicator for a large portion of the "client" population with whom
social work concerns itself has, in other words, inscribed "culture"
as a construct which no social work researcher, practitioner, or
educator can credibly ignore.
The cultural critic Stuart Hall (1980)asserts that "no single, unproblematic definition of 'culture' is to be found here [in various
discussions of culture]. The concept remains a complex one-a
site of convergent interests, rather than logically or conceptually
clarified idea" (p. 522). As the anthropologist Susan Wright noted
of the classic review of "culture" in Anthropology, already "By
mid-century, Kroeber and Kluckhohn had found 164 definitions
in their famous review of what anthropologists meant by culture"
(1998, p. 7). Some examples of more recent works attesting to
enduring dilemma of the culture concept in Anthropology and
elsewhere can be found in Keesing (1974) and his updated version
of the same topic in (1994), Matthews (1989), Boggs (2004), and
Cochran (1994).
The examination the concept of culture as such a "site of
convergent interests"-its salience, its substance, and most importantly, its function as a powerful category of identity-has been
interrogated by scholars outside of social work (Abu-Lughod,
1991; Appadurai, 1996; Archer, 1985; Bhabha, 1994; Bourdieu,
1991; Brown, 1995; Foucault, 1972; Gramsci, 1985; Stuart Hall & du
Gay, 1996; Mitchell, 1995; Rosaldo, 1993; Said, 1994; Young, 1995).
The increasing focus on "culture" as a problematic occlusion
of the dynamic of power in our society-a displacement from
the discourse of other politically significant factors such as race,
class, and gender-has also been discussed elsewhere (Gordon &
Newfield, 1996; Scott, 1995; Stolcke, 1995).
Despite the ubiquity of its usage, however, neither the meaning nor the significance of the concept of culture has been sufficiently examined in social work. What the sociologist Margaret
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Archer (1985) has said of the conceptualization of culture in that
discipline, that "it has displayed the weakest analytical development of any key concept" which "remains inordinately vague
despite little dispute that it is indeed a core concept" (p. 333) can
also be said for social work. The salience of "culture" and the efficacy of multiculturalism, its main paradigmatic support, remain
uncontested and under-examined in social work discourse. "Culture," which the critic Raymond Williams (1976) has famously
called "one of the two or three most complicated words in the
English language" (p. 87), remains a taken-for-granted term in
social work, a "naturalized" concept in Marxist terms.
As the historian Hayden White observed, there is exquisite
difficulty involved in speaking about or defining with a degree
of clarity and precision, any perpetually convoluting and contestable concepts such as culture.
When we seek to make sense of such problematical topics as human
nature, culture, society, and history, we never say precisely what
we wish to say or mean precisely what we say. Our discourse
always tends to slip away from our data towards the structures
of consciousness with which we are trying to grasp them; or what
amounts to the same thing, the data always resist the coherency of
the image which we are trying to fashion them. More over, in topics
such as these there are always legitimate grounds for differences of
opinion as to what they are, how they should be spoken about, and
the kinds of knowledge we can have of them. (White, 1978, p. 1)
Anyone who has attempted to sort out that which is due to
"culture" and that which is not and anyone who has attempted to
delineate one "culture" from another, will recognize the aptness
of both Williams' and White's descriptions, and it is, perhaps, the
sheer slipperiness of the term that deters social work from examining the construct. If, however, the difficulty of conceptualization
and communication were the only issue, social work discourse
should resound with discussion and debate about "culture": how
it should be conceived and why it should be conceived thus,
however clamorous and contentious the resulting discussion may
be. But no such debate is evident.
The absence of debate and deliberation cannot easily be attributed to social work's lack of recognition that constructs such
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as "culture" are consequential. A field so sensitive to the power
of labels, which insists on "serving clients" rather than "helping
patients," is obviously aware of the perils of language and its
uses. The lack arises, perhaps in part, from social work's conceptualization of the issue as one of measurement rather than
premise. Our struggles with the definitional niceties of our basic
constructs tend to be limited to the problem of methodology:
the difficulty in determining the right variables to represent the
category/construct at hand. The assumption appears to be that
if we had better tools or methods then we could actually get to,
and measure, the thing itself. The essential existence of culture
is taken for granted, in other words, and it is only the deficits of
our existing methodologies in capturing and measuring culture
that we find troublesome; the problem is conceived as the need
for epistemological refinement rather than ontological scrutiny.
CDA, on the other hand, sees the examination of the taken-forgranted assumption, the investigation of basic constructs, as the
crucial task at hand. Discursive demarcations-the acts of naming, classifying, and categorizing-necessary to all language usage are in themselves considered acts of power which demarcate
the center from the periphery, the normal from the deviant, the
same from the different, self from the Other. Identities and realities
constructed through such discursive practices are, consequently,
not only constructed in ways that conceal their manufacture, but
are always constructed unequally, legitimating one at the cost of
the other. From this perspective on language and discourse, destablizing basic constructs-interrogating, contesting, and reinscribing entrenched, sedimented, and naturalized assumptionsbecomes a political imperative. On this view, a task which we tend
to see as an ancillary aggravation to the real work of building
interventions, is deemed necessary as a mode of resistance against
the marginalizing, exclusionary forces of hegemonic ideologies.
De-naturalizing occluded assumptions, the taken-for-granted
context of discourse, is a key task of CDA. That which is uncovered through CDA as both an agent and a product of discursive occlusion is usually defined as ideology (N. Fairclough &
Wodak, 1997). Ideology's ordinary indiscernibility in discourse
is attributed to the functioning of hegemonic power. Cast in the
neo-Marxist terminology of Norman Fairclough (1995),
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the power to control discourse is seen as the power to sustain
particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over other alternative (including oppositional)
practices.... such assumptions are quite generally naturalized, and
people are generally unaware of them and of how they are subjected
by/to them. (p. 2)

Although most critical discourse analysts inscribe the mode of
hegemonic power as "ideology," it can also be understood to
be any version of structurally or "culturally" imposed dominating/subjugating power that functions to construct unequal
identities-whether based on gender, race, culture, or other inscriptions of power. Kress' (1996) use of Bourdieu's concept of
the "habitus" rather than "ideology" to capture the naturalizing
dynamic of power which devises and maintains the unequal
binary positionalities of the subject/object is an example.
Another thesis central to CDA is that language and discursive
practices are not simply reflections of ideology and the manifestation of power, but active agents in the hegemonic process of
constructing and maintaining ideology. Rejecting classic structuralisms from orthodox Marxist materialism to Saussurean linguistics and Levi-Straussian anthropology, CDA maintains that
discourse is to be understood not as an epiphenomenal product
of structural determinants, but as a constitutive mode/function
of power relations. "CDA sees discourse-language use in speech
and writing-as a form of 'social practice'

. . .

discourse is socially

constitutive as well as socially shaped" (N. Fairclough & Wodak,
1997, p. 258). Cameron (1997), a feminist scholar of discourse,
locates this approach within a postmodernist turn: "whereas sociolinguistics traditionally assumes that people talk the way they
do because of who they (already) are, the postmodernist approach
suggests that people are who they are because of (among other
things) the way they talk" (p. 49).
CDA is posed in part as a critique of conventional discourse
analyses whose lack of concern for the role of power in discourse,
and whose nave/hegemonic faith/insistence upon positivistic
inquiry is deemed a serious socio-political failure. Though some
scholars are more explicit than others in identifying their positions, CDA does locate itself unambiguously on a political terrain.
Fairclough's (1995) definition of CDA is a fair description of its
topography: "this [CDAI framework is seen here and throughout
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as a resource for people who are struggling against domination
and oppression in its linguistic forms" (p. 1). Discourse being "always/already political" (Pennycook, 1994, p.131), the role of the
discourse analyst cannot be other than politicized, and for some
scholars, even activist in character since the ultimate purpose
of CDA, for them is the engendering of social change. "Critical
studies of language, Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse
Analysis have from the beginning had a political project: broadly
speaking that of altering inequitable distributions of economic,
cultural and political goods in contemporary societies" (Kress,
1996, p. 15). Or in the words of Teun van Dijk (1997):
Analysis, description and theory formation play a role especially in
as far as they allow better understanding and critique of social inequality, based on gender, ethnicity, class, origin, religion, language,
sexual orientation and other criteria that define differences among
people. Their ultimate goal is not only scientific, but also social and
political, namely change. (van Dijk, 1997, p. 22).
Discursive Lacunae
Although the concept of culture is central to the reviewed
works on cultural competency and much attention is devoted
to delineating methods for working "appropriately" or "sensitively" with those who have "culture," most of the reviewed
pieces do not anchor their assertions upon explicitly delineated
definitions of "culture." Most of the articles do not provide any
definition at all while the three that do, Liberman (1990), McPhatter (1997), and Christensen (1992), do so only in vague terms.
Whether the authors assume a discipline-wide consensus on the
definition of "culture," consider it a matter of common sense
understanding obviating the need to use up any of the already
scarce space allotted a journal article, or recognize the task as a
troublesome one and opt simply to ignore it, the central construct
of "culture" is left invariably ill-defined.
In her 1990 article "Culturally sensitive intervention with children and families," Lieberman, one of the three who do attempt
a definition, describes the theory of cultural adaptation rather
than giving a straightforward definition of "culture." She cites
a particular childrearing strategy of an African tribal group to
make the point that cultural practices develop in response to an

18

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

actual or perceived need for survival in a given environment.
Guisi women's custom of toting their children on their backs is
attributed to their need to keep children away from open cooking
fires. The author candidly concedes that there are endless variety
of adaptive strategies which the Guisi could have chosen for child
safety, "but for reasons of their own, restricting mobility is the
adaptation the Guisi came up with" (Lieberman, 1990, p. 102).
The analysis here seems incomplete in two obvious ways. If,
for one, the given survival-driven adaptation theory is taken to
its logical end, the explanation for the particular choice must
be that a host of survival needs working in complex concert
determined that no other method but this would do. If such a
theory is to be rejected, then surely it is those ineffable factors
which fall under the unexamined rubric of "reasons of their own"
that constitute the crux of how "culture" develops. In either
case, however, an explanation of how "culture" develops is an
insufficient substitute for a definition of what "culture" is.
Christensen, in her 1992 article detailing a curriculum for
Canadian school of social work, uses a definition attributed to
Elaine Pinderhughes. "Culture" in this case is described as "consisting of commonalities around which people have developed
values, norms, family styles, social roles, and behaviors, in response to the historical political, economic, and social realities
they face" (1992). The latter part of this description traces its roots
to the anthropological survival/adaptation theory utilized by
Lieberman, and is similarly, a description of the etiology of "culture" rather than a definition of it. The first part of the description,
explaining 'culture" as a set of "commonalities" around which
values, norms, styles, roles, and behaviors have been constructed,
suggests the existence of culture as a kind of meta-phenomenon
from which the given laundry list of social configurations arise.
As a distinct departure from the commonly espoused idea that
culture is those very values, norms, family structures, social roles,
etc. rather than something that produces them, the theory is of
interest. However, in failing to define what those commonalities
are (race? ethnicity? religion? locality?) the description remains
as ambiguous as the previous.
In her 1997 article on cultural competence in child welfare,
McPhatter cites James Green's (1999) definition that culture is
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"those elements of people's history, tradition, values, and social
organizations that become implicitly or explicitly meaningful to
the participants ... in cross-cultural encounters" (p. 265). The
most obvious problem with Green's definition is his employment
of the term to define the term-culture as that which becomes
meaningful in a cross-culturalencounter. This kind of tautological
enterprise is all too common among the authors who tend to
write about culture as that which people of diverse ethnic, racial,
and cultural background have. More importantly, taken out of
whatever context it originally appeared in, Green's definition
of culture is an oblique and incomplete dictum. In describing
what culture does, rather than what it is, Green's explanation
serves to raise more questions than it answers. Which elements
of history, traditions, values, and social organizations constitute
culture? How do these discrete elements become transformed,
aggregated, as culture? Does the definition imply that culture is
transactional in nature? If so, does culture come into existence as
an entity or a recognizable phenomenon only within the context
of a transaction? Can, culture, in this sense, be said to exist?
Sowers-Hoag and Sandau-Beckler, the authors of "Educating
for cultural competence in the generalist curriculum" (1996) do
not provide a definition for culture. They do, however, talk about
culture as a matter of personal identity and an essential ingredient for individual dignity. Cultural competence is, therefore,
described as a "commitment to preserving the dignity of the client
by preserving their culture" (p. 39). Since, as will be discussed in
later sections of this paper, the pervasive underlying assumption
of these works is the notion that culture is that which differentiates minorities, immigrants, and refugees from the rest of
society, culture as a signifier of personal dignity and identity can
be understood to be true only of minority/immigrant/refugee
populations. If culture, characterized as a kind of a personal and
community resource, is of significance and relevance only to minority/underprivileged populations, then it must be understood
also as a paradoxical measure of deficiency; that which marks one
as being less than those without it, and simultaneously, that which
one must strive to retain as a buffer against that very weighted
differential.
The idea of identity and personal dignity being intrinsically
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tied to culture is present also in Lieberman's piece. Immigration,
in so far as it places a person outside of a familiar language and
mores, is said to cause in some cases, "a shattered sense of one's
identity" (Lieberman, 1990, p. 104); that countries ravaged by war
and political upheaval and the subsequent destruction of cultural
institutions that have traditionally "upheld their sense of personal
dignity" (p. 105) produce emigrants who experience a cultural
crisis as well as a personal one. The given example of the prevailing argument against interracial adoption that "Black babies will
ultimately suffer from severe identity problems if they are raised
by parents of a different ethnic background," (p. 105) speaks to
the paradoxical use of culture as both deficit and necessity. In
citing this particular issue, however, the author also exposes a
key conceptual problem common among the reviewed articles.
In throwing together the "race" of the babies, the ethnicity of
adoptive parents, and the cultures of both as a single undemarcated impediment to successful adoption, Lieberman displays a
characteristic conceptual snarl which appears to be at the heart
of social work's discussion of cultural competence.
Though "culture" is much employed-deployed-in these
pieces, basic critical analyses interrogating the validity, adequacy,
and legitimacy of this plainly meaningful and exceedingly consequential signifier are conspicuously missing. The unimpeachability of "culture" as a sensible signifier for large segments of
our client populations appears to be taken as truth established
beyond question. Despite these lacunae, the discussions do on
the whole provide an abundance of substance from which implicit
definitions for culture and the ramifications of their deployment
can be inferred. Because of these lacunae, critical consideration of
the inscriptions and deployment becomes essential. The point is
that the discourse's lack of transparency and legibility regarding
its choices for inscription and deployment highlights the need for
critical examination, and opens up the space in which to do so.
Culture as Deficit
In the literature reviewed, "culture" is inscribed unambiguously as a signifier of difference: "a state of enlightened consciousness enables one to connect with culturally different others
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at a new level of excitement and joy" (McPhatter, 1997, p. 265);
"problems experienced by culturally diverse persons" (SowersHoag & Sandau-Beckler, 1996, p. 38). This difference is written
as a particular marker for ethnic minorities and people of color.
All of the reviewed articles employ the labels "minority," "people
of color," and "ethnic" as synonyms for the "culturally different"
and the "culturally diverse." Morelli (1998) states, for example
that:
In the United States, our increasing populations of ethnic and racial
minorities suffering with severe mental illnesses require culturally
sensitive and culturally appropriate mental health services. The
multiple facets of work involving culturally diverse individuals
with severe mental illness challenge social work faculty to prepare
students with salient, useful knowledge and skills. (p. 75)
Lieberman (1990), writes:
on the average,it is more likely that a person from a particular culture
(let's say Hispanic) will display more of a particular characteristiclet's say a tendency to defer to the wishes of others-than a person
from another culture where that value is less prevalent. (p. 109)
That "culture" is conflated with race and ethnicity is conceptually and methdologically dubious; that it is invariably equated
with minority races and ethnicities is cause for consternation.
Deployed as a synonym for race, the traditional demarcator for
difference in US society, and ethnicity, the sophisticated multifarious variant of "race," "culture" functions in this discourse as a
referential demarcator measuring the distance these Others stand
in relation to the Caucasian mainstream, inscribed in its turn as
the "culture-free" norm. The inscription of "difference" begs the
question "different from what?" Explicitly stated in some cases,
(Pinderhughes, 1997; Mason et al, 1996; McPhatter, 1997; Lieberman, 1990) and implied in other cases (Sowers-Hoag & SandauBeckler, 1996; Haynes &Singh, 1992), the "white" mainstream as
the point of comparison for difference and divergence is again
consistent throughout the reviewed pieces. Lieberman (1990),
referring to "Latino values," states in the most obvious example,
that "when it comes to respect for the parents and the management of anger, the differences from Anglos are clear" (p. 108).
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Although,, this "cultural-sensitivity" accounting of group differences is a distinct improvement on the pernicious tradition of the
mono-cultural grand narrative, this distinctively multiculturalist
vision is not without problems.
Against the blank, white backdrop of the "culture-free" mainstream, the "cultured" Others are made visible in sharp relief,
and this visibility-a sign of separateness and differentiation
from the standard-are inscriptions of marginality. Embedded
in the conceptualization of culture as difference, in other words,
is that of difference conceptualized as deficiency. "Culture" in
this arithmetic is a marker for the periphery, a contradictory
descriptor for a deficit, since to have "culture," in this schema, is
to be assigned a position subordinate to that of those inscribed as
without "culture." As the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo (1993)
puts it, "the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys,
and the more culture one has, the less power one wields" (p. 202).
"Difference" or "diversity," linked to the notion of culture in social
work discourse does not describe the overall variance among cultures; does not function as a neutral descriptor for heterogeneity,
but is a unidirectional identifier for those who are not normative.
In inscribing and deploying "culture" as a discursive device
marking out minority populations, the discourse simultaneously
defines its opposite. If "culture" and its contents are understood
to be socially constructed demarcators, then not only "cultured"
minorities, but the "culture-free" majority must be understood as
an inconstant identity which is constructed rather than found.
Culture never stands alone but always participates in a conflictual
economy acting out the tension between sameness and difference,
comparison and differentiation, unity and diversity, cohesion and
dispersion, containment and subversion. (Young, 1995, p. 53)
Despite its insistent rhetoric of cultural relativism or multiculturalism purporting the sensibility that cultures are different but
equal, social work constructs and deploys the central concept of
culture as a device marking simultaneously that which is on the
inside of the margins, and that which is outside.
Culture Reified
As a measure for gauging difference from the norm, "culture" and cultural borders are assigned in social work discourse
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in reductionist terms that allow for enumeration and categorization. "Culture" and cultural attribute are presented as reified characteristics-fixed difference rather than positional divergence-which can be attributed to groups of people, who in turn
can be identified by those essential attributes. Such essentialist definitions of culture are usually modified, appended often
with caveats asserting that, in fact, "culture" is not static but
ever changing, and additionally, that people, being individual,
have differing levels of identification or ties to their cultures.
These caveats, do not, however, substantively affect the functional
conceptualization and deployment of "culture" in the discourse,
since the idea of changeability and fluidity are assigned not to
the category of "culture" itself, but the specifics of characteristic attributes. Remaining embedded within the caveat is the
identification of a static core "culture" which can be modified
and differentially adhered to, since variance must center around
something, and modification presupposes a core entity which can
be modified but remain discernible as itself.
Writers who are attempting to generalize about ethnic cultures
typically qualify their descriptions by pointing out that research is
limited, that groups are heterogeneous, and that many conclusions
are based on informal observations or clinical experience rather than
on empirical[sic] data (e.g., Uba, 1994). Nevertheless, there appear
to be core characteristics that many accounts agree on. (Phinney,
1996, p. 920)
Identification of such core cultural attributes abound in the
reviewed literature. Lieberman (1990) writes about the difference
between "the quintessentially American value of individualism"
(p. 107) and the oft cited Hispanic value of collectivism. Referring to a study conducted to prove this idea, she reports that
while "Anglos" were found to value "honesty, sincerity, and
moderation" "Hispanics" were found to value "being sensitive
to others, loyal, dutiful, and gracious" (p. 170). Woll (1996) advises that "writers such as Sue and Sue, Atkinson, Maryuma,
and Matsui, and Bryson and Bardo have clearly articulated that
ethnic minorities do not particularly value 'personal insight' or
the ability to talk about the deepest and most intimate aspects of
one's life" (p. 71). Mason et al. (1996) assert that "people of color
are more likely to be in an extended family configuration," and

24

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

that another example of the difference between people of color
and the "dominant culture" is the "concept of time, which for
many people of color is more past- or present-based as opposed
to future-oriented for people of European descent" (p. 168).
The multiple slippages evident in Mason's attribution of social practices to the racial designation of "color," and the pairing of the racialized marker of "color" against the geographic
(and arguably "cultural") descriptor "European" are problematic
conflations which merit examination in themselves (Dyer, 1997).
But the point to be made here is that the identification and the
preservation of such identification-stereotypes in other wordsare made possible by the acceptance of the conceptualization
of culture as a category defined by essential, fixable traits. The
conceptualization which constructs, inscribes, and naturalizes
the dominant as the normative, "culture-free," and "white," also
makes possible this reification of "culture" and obstructs the
legibility of both positions as constructed distinctions. The seemingly evident connection between the reification of "culture" and
the generation of such cultural stereotypes is, to reiterate, kept
assiduously occluded. While stereotypes of racial characteristics
are vehemently repudiated in social work discourse, stereotypes
fashioned from "culture," a term used interchangeably with, and
as a descriptor for race, escapes equal censure.
Culture Commodified
What then is the utility of conceptualizing "culture" as a
static phenomena which emphasizes the "homogeneity of culture
and the imperative of uniform traditions?" (Jayasuriya, 1992,
p. 41) If "culture" can be claimed in objective terms, that is,
if "culture" is conceptualized as an inventory of set traits or
identifiable markers, it can also become classified as a body of
knowledge which can be studied, disseminated, and acquired,
however complex and difficult those process might be. Such a
discourse, furthermore, enables the production of the "cultured"
as a "social reality which is at once an 'other' and yet entirely
knowable and visible" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 70).
One obvious benefit of this commodification of "culture"constructing "culture" as a knowable, measurable thing-is that

Culture as Deficit

25

it allows social work to both study and teach about "culture"
and the "cultured." Perhaps more importantly, as an acquirable
and transferable body of objectifiable knowledge, "culture" can
be reduced to the level of problems for which interventions, to
be practiced upon the "cultured" and their problematic differences, can be devised. While interventions to be practiced upon
the "raced" and "ethnicized" for their problematic differences
may be objectionable to social work, interventions conceived to
ameliorate differences attributed to "culture" are, through this
conceptual mechanism, made not only possible but palatable.
The difficulties inherent in such assimilative or even acculturative enterprises are freely acknowledged in the literature
reviewed. The problem, however, is generally attributed not to the
mechanisms of a discursive construction which objectifies "culture," but to constraints in current pedagogical methodologies
which are as yet incapable of fully enumerating and enlightening
students and practitioners about the great multiplicity of cultures
and their various attributes. The problem is conceptualized as
our inadequate technology and inadequate commitment to the
cause. If there were only sufficient time, funding, institutional,
and societal support, social workers could acquire and inculcate
in others the requisite body of cultural information. If a truly inspired methodology or technology for researching, acquiring, and
disseminating cultural knowledge could be discovered and be
sufficiently disseminated, social workers could become competent to deal with the "cultured" and their accompanying cultural
issues.
The key problem inherent to the discursive designation of
"culture" as an essential, identifiable, knowable entity, is that
the central role of power becomes concealed. One of the more
interesting consequences of this construction of culture is that it
obviates the necessity of structural reform. Although the subject is
too complex to discuss here in brief, the individualizing, pathologizing function of this construction is worth further study. If
the "cultured" are indeed the exotic, different, deficient human
beings, the construction inscribes them as, then the source of the
problem lies in their difference and their inability to adapt to the
normative society, not vice versa.
What becomes occluded in the discourse is that the exoticiz-
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ing, stereotyping constructions of those marked by "culture" as
the Other becomes possible only through the objectification inherent in the assigning to "culture" and those marked by "culture" an
inventory of essential characteristics; that within this paradigm,
the Other, the object of knowledge and intervention, cannot be
construed as other than subordinate to its dominant counterpart
who occupies the position of the knowing, intervening Subject.
In the language of a feminist critic who likens this dichotomy
between the dominant subject and the subjugated object, to that
between the European and the Oriental:
Orientalism is part of the European identity that defines 'us' versus the non-Europeans. To go further, the studied object becomes
another being with regard to whom the studying subject becomes
transcendent. Why? Because, unlike the Oriental, the European
observer is a true human being.(Hartsock, 1987, p. 546)
Discursive Hegemony
The prototypical argument offered against the viewpoint outlined in this paper is succinctly expressed by historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr.: "It is time to adjourn the chat about hegemony. If
hegemony were as real as the cultural radicals pretend, Afrocentrism would never have got anywhere" (1991, p. 5 7 0). Whether or
not Afrocentrism is the actual end product they would promote,
both Schlesinger and social work discourse appear to accept
as a self-evident truth that the persistence of multiculturalism
is evidence of progress. The device of identity politics which
built departments of Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies in the
academy, and forged the course towards ethnic consciousness,
diversity promotion, and cultural relativism in its applied arenas,
are accredited by both as measures of an emancipatory teleology,
headed steadfastly (or precariously, depending on one's politics) toward the eventual eradication of racial/ethnic/cultural
inequities in our society.
The contrasting view raised by this paper, echoing a multidisciplinary plethora of critiques and examinations of the focus on
"culture" and the multiculturalist paradigm, is that this fragmenting enterprise may be an essentially convoluting undertaking
which not only fails in producing its purported goal of progres-
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sive liberation, but actually fortifies the inequities it purports to
undo. The point is that social, political, and economic hegemony
maintained by an orthodox ideology cannot be deposed by constructions contrived from the confines of that very ideology. In
the words of Audre Lorde (1979), "the master's tools will never
dismantle the master's house" (p. 486).
Discursive power constructs "truths," defines "realities," and
maintains these constructions as devices which simultaneously
produce and preserve that power (Foucault, 1977). Social work's
turn to the construct of culture, its posing of multiculturalism as
its primary emancipatory modality is, in the language of another
critic, a conceptual and methodological dead-end similar to the
dilemma of misapplied postmodernism: "If interest in postmodernism is limited to a celebration of the fragmentation of the
'grand narratives' of post-enlightenment rationalism, then, for
all its intellectual excitement, it remains a profoundly parochial
enterprise (Bhabha, 1994, p. 4).
Despite all its good intentions, as long as social work remains
bound within the paradigm which celebrates the inscription of
"culture" as racialized and ethnicized deficits, its discourse as
well as its applications will remain parochial and subjugatory
endeavors that assume the guise of change while reinforcing
marginalization.
Furthermore, social work's multiculturalism bolsters this
marginalizing paradigm through enlisting its subjugated, lessthan-normative, minority clientele as compliant partners in their
marginalization. What Gramsci (1992) said about capitalismthat the ruling do so not by manifest coercion but through the production and maintenance of ideas and ideals which obscure the
need for contestation and manufacture the willing acquiescence
of the ruled-might also be said of our deployment of "culture."
Those who are demarcated by the deficit marker of "culture," in
other words, accede to the hegemonic claim that the very measures which define them as "cultured" and therefore "deficit" entities, are also the devices for their progressive liberation. Cultureenforcing interventions, in this light, should be problematized
as power-obscuring, conciliatory measures that serve to both
distract from and occlude out the mechanisms behind both the
conceptualization of the problem and their proffered solution.

28

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

According to Bourdieu (1977) a hegemonic discourse "delimits
the universe of possible discourse" (p. 165). Social Work's lack of
examination key constructs such as "culture," must be problematized.
The mechanics of the orthodoxy is another question entirely
too complicated to pursue here. But I will pose two possible
threads to follow in answering the question of why social work,
despite its avowed mission to oppose and to dismantle such oppression, remains entrenched within the paradigm which might
very well enforces it. Perhaps in part it does so because inherent
in its mission to mend the consequences of social problems is the
professional necessity for determining and enforcing appropriate behavior. That dominant ideology determines that which is
"appropriate" should, hopefully, be clear by this juncture in the
discussion. This primary imperative cannot but exist in conflict
with the other, later call for multiculturalism which claims in
essence that all behaviors should be viewed as appropriate: "all
values are equally important because whatever occurs within a
cultural milieu, can only be appraised and given meaning within
that particular cultural context." (Jayasuriya, 1992, p. 40). Social
work's reluctance to examine and expose the tension between
these two antithetical disciplinary imperatives, is perhaps understandable. Its existence as a viable profession depends on the
maintenance of the paradigm which ensures that such troubling
questions become concealed. The reification, or the commodification of culture and cultural traits is necessary to social work's
professionalization project-the turf-claiming, identity-seeking
enterprise which attempts to demarcate its incontestable purview
apart from and on equal footing with other disciplines such as
psychology, sociology, psychiatry, and economics. Social work
has claimed culture, particularly the practice of cultural competency, however precarious such a claim may be, as an arena in
which it outstrips the competing disciplines. Perhaps more to the
point, the reification of culture is maintained, since if social work
cannot claim a body of objective, transmissible, and acquirable
knowledge from which measurable outcomes and interventions
can be built, it also cannot claim the legitimate disciplinary status
in the academy it has for so long pursued.
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Conclusion
This paper has outlined the position that in social work discourse, "culture" is inscribed as a marker for difference, and that
difference, constructed from within an orthodoxic, hegemonic
discursive paradigm, is deployed as a marker of deficit. "Culture"
has also largely replaced the categories of race and ethnicity as the
preferred trope of difference: it is a markedly less controversial
indicator than race, a category despite whose continued ubiquity
is increasingly denied both conceptual legitimacy and political
bona fides. It is also a more profitable device than ethnicity, a
descriptor which seems to be used currently as a kind of particularized progeny of "race," and appears to be particularly useful
only when coupled with "culture," its functional enunciation.
The concept of culture has come to characterize the minority, the
"person of color." Additionally, "culture," as the operationalized
measure of racial and ethnic status, is conceived as an objectifiable body of knowledge which can constitute the legitimate
foundation for the building of interventions. Such interventions,
produced entirely within the conceptual paradigm which constructs "culture" as a deficit marker for subjected populations,
cannot be considered other than an instrument which reinforces
the subjugating paradigm from which it is fashioned.
Given this proposition that social work, either as a conflicted
entity which finds itself in an irresolvable bind between two
antithetical imperatives, or as a subjugating body which claims to
dismantle hegemony while actively promoting it, fails in achieving its professed goals, what then can be done? What alternative
conceptualizations and modes of practice can be adopted? The
single suggestion offered by this paper is for social work to take
pause from its preoccupation with the production of interventions
and critically examine, de-naturalize, its foundational conceptsto excavate and uncover the mechanisms which assemble and
perpetuate the predicament that renders its interventions moot.
As Henry Louis Gates (1986) put it: "To use contemporary theories
of criticism to explicate these modes of inscription is to demystify
large and obscure ideological relations and, indeed, theory itself"
(p. 592). Or in the words of Cornel West (1990), "demystification
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is the most illuminating mode of theoretical inquiry for those
who promote the new cultural politics of difference" (West, 1990,
p. 589).
Whether such a demystifying process can produce a different
kind of discourse, a qualitatively different means of language
usage which can be employed by social work to address the needs
of the population it serves, without automatically attributing
deficiencies to them or the issues that they confront, is difficult
to foresee. Such a language, or a method of discourse would
have to allow for the de-inscription from "culture" its current
encumbrance of subjugation, allowing it to be understood not as
a marker for the Other, but as a descriptor for inevitable human
variation.
Bhabha contends that:
the transformational value of change lies in the rearticulation, or
translation, of elements that are neither the One (unitary working
class) nor the Other (the politics of gender) but something else besides,
which contests the terms and territories of both. (Bhabha, 1994, p. 28)
The one, in the case of social work can be translated as the
pre-multiculturalist-Eurocentric and monocultural-discourse
and application, and the other as the current multiculturalist
discourse and application. The argument made throughout this
paper has been that while the former is a pernicious form of
bigotry which social work has long struggled to stamp out from
its discourse, the latter ideal, conceived usually as the ideal replacement of the first, is also problematic.
Whether a transformation or a change can be instituted to
rework, rearticulate, those two subjugating discourses to create a
more radical emancipatory discourse and application is difficult
to conceive, however necessary it may be. It is clear, however,
that the transformative role of contemporary social work must be
devised as something fundamentally unlike the role it assumed
in adopting its fragmentary multiculturalist ideals. Although the
mechanisms for achieving this are far from easy to envision, it is
apparent that the initial step must be the task of examination,
the demystification and contestation of the current discourse
necessary to createthe conceptual space in which alternatives can
be posed, tested, and contested.

Culture as Deficit

31

The manifest censorship imposed by orthodox discourse, the official
way of speaking and thinking the world, conceals another, more
radical censorship: the overt opposition between "right" opinion
and 'left" or "wrong" opinion, which delimits the universe of possible
discourse, be it legitimate or illegitimate, euphemistic or blasphemous, masks in its turn the fundamental opposition between the
universe of things that can be stated, and hence thought, and the
universe of that which is taken for granted. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 165)
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